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FIFTY YEARS OF NEW ZEALAND FAMILY LAW 
Bil.LA TKIN*, JOHN CALDWELL**, MARK HENAGHAN*** 
AND PAULINE TAPP**** 
This collaborative anicle examines the significant changes to New Zealand family law 
during the last 50 years. The anicle canvasses three areas that have seen substantial 
changes during this time - what constitutes a legal family; changes in the exercise of 
judicial discretion in family law cases involving children; and the evolution of the 
financial and property consequences of family breakdown. The anicle initially focuses 
on the law's reaction to the changing New Zealand family and the important milestones 
in this legal evolution. This is accompanied by a detailed, historic analysis of the 
difficulties in deciding what is "best" for children involved in family law disputes and 
the degree of judicial discretion that should be exercised during this process. The 
article concludes by chronicling the significant legislative changes since 1963 
concerning the financial implications of relationship breakdown and how this affects 
the children involved. This article illustrates how far New Zealand has come in the last 
50 years regarding the increased legal recognition and protection of a wide variety of 
familial relationships. However, it argues that the recent debates surrounding adoption 
and marriage equality indicate that there is still a way to go before the law treats all 
New Zealand families equally. 
A. Introduction 
New Zealand family law has undergone momentous change in the last 50 
years. Even the very concept of what constitutes a legally recognised family 
has changed considerably during this time. This article considers three areas of 
significant change in New Zealand family law: what constitutes a legal family; 
changes in the exercise of judicial discretion in family law cases involving 
children; and how the financial and property consequences of family 
breakdown have evolved. 
B. The Changing Nature of New Zealand Families 
During the 1960s the nuclear family (usually solely created by marriage) was 
far and away the societal norm. The labour market, taxation, social assistance, 
laws and public policies all primarily revolved around the married, nuclear 
family .1 This has changed significantly over the last 50 years. The following 
statistics, primarily based on Census data, provide compelling evidence of the 
changing nature of New Zealand families during this time. 
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Families Commission (Komihana ii Whanau) The Kiwi Nest: 60 Years of Change it1 New 
Zealand Families (Families Commission (Komihana ii Whiinau), Research report no 3/08, 
June 2008) at 32. 
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In 1961 the marriage rate in New Zealand was high at 38.2 marriages per 
1,000 not-married population aged 16 and over.2 However, in recent times, 
marriage has become less prevalent. In 2011 the marriage rate was 11.8, nearly 
one-quarter of the peak of 45.5 in 1971.3 Remarriage rates are high. Thirty-one 
per cent of marriages registered in 2009 involved the remarriage of one or both 
partners, compared with a rate of 16 per cent in 1971.4 New Zealand now 
legally recognises de facto relationships between all couples irrespective of 
sex, sexual orientation and gender identity. By 2006, almost two-in-five men 
and women aged between 15-55 years old in partnerships were in de facto 
relationships.5 Civil unions were introduced in 2004 and can be celebrated by 
all couples regardless of sex, sexual orientation and gender identity.6 By 31 
March 2012 2,745 civil unions had been registered.7 Of these, 80 per cent were 
same-sex civil unions.8 Marriage in New Zealand was limited solely to 
heterosexual couples. However, all couples irrespective of sex, sexual 
orientation and gender identity are now able to marry.9 
In the 1960s women had more children and gave birth at a younger age 
than they do now. The fertility rate in 1961 was 4.31 births per woman. 10 In the 
year ended September 2012 it had more than halved to 2.03 births per 
woman. 11 The median age of women giving birth was 26 years in the early 
1960s.12 In 2012 the median age of women giving birth was 30 years.13 
2 Families Commission (Komihana ii Whiinau) The Kiwi Nest, above n 1, at 20. 
3 Geoff Bascand Marriages, Civil U11io11s, a11d Divorces: Year E11ded December 2011 
(Statistics New Zealand, Wellington, 3 May 2012) at 2. 
4 Geoff Bascand Demographic Trends 2010 (Statistics New Zealand, Wellington, 31 January 
2011) at chapter 3. 
5 Families Commission (Komihana ii Whiinau) New Zealand Families Today: A Brief 
Demographic Profile Fact Sheet OJ (Families Commission (Komihana ii Whiinau), 
Wellington, August 2012) at 7. 
6 See generally Civil Union Act 2004. For more information about sex, sexual orientation and 
gender identity terminology see Ministry of Social Development Selected GLBTI* 
Definitions (GLBTI Policy Team, Wellington, 2008). 
7 Families Commission (Komihana ii Whiinau) New Zealand Families Today, above n 5, at 8. 
8 At8. 
9 On 26 July 2012 Labour MP Louisa Wall's Marriage (Definition of Marriage) Amendment 
Bill was pulled out of the Parliamentary Members' Bills Ballot and introduced to the House. 
The purpose of this Bill (as clause 4 of the Bill sets out) is: "to amend the principal Act [the 
Marriage Act] to clarify that a marriage is between 2 people regardless of their sex, sexual 
orientation, or gender identity''. On 29 August 2012 the Marriage (Definition of Marriage) 
Amendment Bill (39-1) passed its first reading in a Parliamentary conscience vote 80 votes to 
40. In its repon to the House on 28 February 2013 the Government Administration 
Committee recommended by a majority that the Bill be passed with amendments including 
the insertion of a clause designed to make clear that a marriage licence shall authorise but not 
oblige any marriage celebrant to solemnise the marriage to which it relates. On 13 March 
2013, the Marriage (Definition of Marriage) Amendment Bill (39-2) passed its second 
reading in a Parliamentary conscience vote 77 votes to 44. For more information about sex, 
sexual orientation and gender identity terminology see Ministry of Social Development, 
above n 6. 
10 Geoff Bascand Births and Deaths: Year Ended September 2012 (Statistics New Zealand, 
Wellington, 20 November 2012) at 4. 
11 Bascand Births and Deaths, above n 10, at 4. 
12 Bascand Births and Deaths, above n 10, at 4. 
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Although over 54 per cent of women born in 1945 had conceived a child 
outside of marriage by the age of 27, most of the women were married before 
giving birth or had placed their child for adoption. 14 However, the social 
expectation of only raising children within marriage has now diminished and 
in 2010 ex-nuptial births consisted of nearly 50 per cent of all live birlhs. 15 The 
highest number of births ever recorded in any year was 65,658 in the year 
ended September 1962.16 In the year ended September 2012 a total of 60,462 
births were recorded. 17 This significant difference across time is compounded 
further when you consider that New Zealand's population in 1962 was only 2.5 
million, whereas the current population is now 4.4 million.18 
The makeup of families has also changed dramatically. In 1966 81.5 per 
cent of the population lived in a household that included either a single person 
or one family only and no others. 19 Statistics from the 2006 Census indicate 
some of the more recent developments in the makeup of the family form.20 In 
2006 just under a third of households were couples with children.21 71.9 per 
cent of families with dependent children were two parent families and 28.1 per 
cent were sole parent families .22 It has been estimated that a third of children 
will have lived in a sole mother family by age 17 years.23 
New Zealand's increasing cultural diversity has required the law to 
understand and recognise different cultural conceptions of "family" and family 
dynamics. In 2006 4,184,600 people lived in New Zealand. Of these 2,817,700 
identified as European or other, 624,300 as Maori, 301,600 as Pacifica, 
404,400 as Asian and 36,600 as having origins in the Middle East, Latin 
America or Africa.24 Such ethnic diversity continues to increase, frequently 
assisted by immigration. For example, in 2009 alone there were 6,000 
immigrants from India, 3,800 from China, 2,300 from the Philippines, 2,200 
from Fiji and 9,100 from the United Kingdom.25 
13 Bascand Births and Deaths, above n 10, at 4. 
14 Families Commission (Komihana ii Whiinau) The Kiwi Nest, above n 1, at 21. 
15 Families Commission (Komihana ii Whiinau) New Zealand Families Today, above n 5, at 11. 
16 Bascand Births and Deaths, above n 10, at 2. 
17 Bascand Births and Deaths, above n 10, at 2. 
18 Bascand Births and Deaths, above n 10, at 2. 
19 Families Commission (Komihana ii Whiinau) The Kiwi Nest, above n 1, at 21. 
20 Families Commission (Komihana ii Whiinau) New Zealand Families Today, above n 5. 
21 Families Commission (Komibana ii Whiinau) New Zealand Families Today, above n 5, at 4. 
22 Families Commission (Komihana ii Whiinau) New Zealand Families Today, above n 5, at 5. 
23 Families Commission (Komihana ii Whiinau) New Zealand Families Today, above n 5, at 5. 
24 Ministry of Social Development The Social Report 2010:te p1irongo oranga tangata 
(Ministry of Social Development, Wellington, 2010) at 11. 
25 Ministry of Social Development The Social Report, above n 24, al 11, provides ethnic 
population projections for 2006-2026. The report suggests that the national percentage of 
European people will drop from 77 per cent of the population in 2006 to 70 per cent in 2026; 
Maori will increase from 15 per cent of the population in 2006 to 16 per cent in 2026; 
Pacifica peoples will increase from seven per cent of the population in 2006 to 10 per cent in 
2026; and Asian peoples will increase from 10 per cent of the population in 2006 to 16 per 
cent in 2026 at 15. 
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1. The law's reaction to the changing New 'Zealand family 
Fifty years ago the legal and dominant social concepts of the family were 
based on marriage, with traditional marital roles and financial rights and 
obligations based on gender. The only recognised parent child relationships 
were either based on genetics or adoption. 
However, in 2012 the law adopts a functional approach to defining the 
family. For most purposes, legal rights and responsibilities attach equally to 
marriage, civil unions and de facto relationships. New Zealand has introduced 
marriage equality, which allows a couple to marry regardless of their "sex, 
sexual orientation or gender identity".26 Recognition is now given to parent 
child relationships, not just based on genetics and adoption, but also on 
psychological attachments,27 and cultural significance.28 There is also increased 
recognition of the intentional family, whereby couples and single people can 
utilise IVF and other birth technologies, such as surrogacy, to create the 
children they desire. 29 
The law's characterisation of the child has changed dramatically in 50 
years. In 1963 the child was perceived as dependent, subsumed within family 
membership and an object of concern.30 New Zealand's ratification of the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1993, and the 
influence of the jurisprudence on the sociology of childhood, led to legal 
recognition of the child as a person in its own right. Children are deserving of 
respect and should be treated as participating members of their family and the 
wider community. This attitude towards children was exemplified by the 
implementation of the Care of Children Act 2004.31 However in the future, 
more families and whiinau may be treated as family units, rather than as a 
26 Marriage (Definition of Marriage) Amendment Bill 2012 (39-2), cl 4. 
27 See generally Tanner v Edghill & Marlow [2008] NZFLR 262, (2007) 26 FRNZ 906 (HC) at 
[39] and Temple v Barr HC Wellington CIV-2010-485-561, 24 August 2010 at [82]. 
28 See NHP v TIT [2012] NZFC 4340 at [15-20) where the Court recognised a whiingai 
arrangement. 
29 Advisory Committee on Assisted Reproductive Technology Proposed Amendmellfs ro 
Guidelines on Surrogacy Arra11gemems lnvolvi11g Providers of Fertility Services and 
Guideli11es 011 Donation of Eggs or Sperm 8e11Veen Cenai11 Family Members: Consultatio11 
Document (ACART, Wellington, 2012) proposes to amend the surrogacy guidelines to 
remove the current prohibition on a same sex couple obtaining permission to enter a 
surrogacy arrangement at 1.2.1. Martin Johnston "A Different Answer to that Question" New 
ualand Herald (Auckland, 3 November 2012) repons that since August 2010 lmmigration 
New Zealand has issued visitor's visas to 18 children born as a result of international 
surrogacy agreements. As current New Zealand law struggles to cope with how to legalise 
the placement of a child born as a result of an international surrogacy arrangement the Family 
Court has called for the government to provide guidance. See Re Application by KR [2011] 
NZFLR 429; Re Application by BWS [2011] NZFLR 621; and Re B [2010] NZFLR 97. In 
response to similar problems internationally the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference 
issued A Preliminary Report on the Issues Arising From /11temational Surrogacy 
Arrangements (Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference, The Hague, March 2012). 
30 See generally Bronwyn Dalley Family Matrers: Child Welfare in Twentieth Century New 
uala11d (Auckland University Press, Auckland, 1998) and Pauline Tapp, Nicola Taylor and 
Mark Henaghan "Agents or Dependants: Children and the Family Law System" in John 
Dewar and Stephen Parker (eds) Family Law Practices, Processes a11d Procedures (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, 2003) at 303. 
31 See Care of Children Act 2004, ss 4-7 and 16(l)(c). 
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collection of individuals, due to proposed legislative reforms and funding 
models. This creates a risk that the distinct interests of children will be lost. 32 
2. Milestones in the legal evolution of the family 
In the 1960s the State's primary concern was broadly to support families. The 
family benefit was universalised in 1946, and the 1958 capitalisation scheme 
allowed families to obtain the family benefit in a lump sum to buy a house or 
finance extensions and renovations of their current home.33 The Joint Family 
Homes Act 1964 and the Family Benefits (Home Ownership) Act 1964 
illustrate the State's emphasis on ensuring all families had a home that was 
protected and secure. The societal prominence of the secure family unit meant 
that children born outside of marriage were still classified as illegitimate until 
1969, when the Status of Children Act 1969 was passed to give such children 
legitimacy. 
The 1960s also saw the emergence of the oral contraceptive pill, which 
gave women more control over their family planning decisions.34 Women 
began to have greater involvement in the workforce during this time,33 and 
general economic adversity, precipitated by the collapse of the world wool 
price in 1967, made it essential for many households to have two sources of 
income.36 
At the end of the 1960s the Domestic Proceedings Act 1968 was passed, 
which emphasised exploring avenues of reconciliation when marriages were in 
difficulty. Society was still focused on keeping families together wherever 
possible. However, by the 1970s separations and divorces had begun to 
increase, which led to many single mothers relying on maintenance orders or 
discretionary emergency benefits to survive. For example, between 1970-1972 
the number of women receiving emergency benefits for domestic purposes 
doubled.37 In 1973, the Domestic Purposes Benefit (DPB) was introduced by 
32 For example, this may well be a consequence of the proposals in cl 5 of the Family Court 
Proceedings Refonn Bill 2012 (90-1) that seek to restrict access to the Family Court for 
applications under the Care of Children Act 2004 and to limit the circumstances in which a 
Lawyer for the Child may be appointed. A further example is provided by the core principles 
underpinning the Family-Centred Services Fund (Whiinau Ora), which focuses on working 
with the whole family and whiinau. See Ministry of Social Development Family-Centred 
Services: Direct Services: Practice Guidelines (Ministry of Social Development, Wellington, 
July 2011) at 5. As from l July 2012 the majority of family violence funding was re-
channelled to the Family-Centred Services Fund. See Ministry of Social Development Family 
Violence Funding: Focus 011 the Fronrline (Ministry of Social Development, Wellington, 
April 2011). 
33 Tim Garlick Social Developments: An organisational history of the Ministry of Social 
Developmellt and its predecessors, 1860-2011 (Steele Roberts Aotearoa, Wellington, 2012) 
at 73 and 76. 
34 Family Planning "History: 1960" Positive Sexual Health - Family Planning 
<www.familyplanning.org.nZ>. 
35 Between 1991 and 2012 the proportion of woman holding a post-school qualification 
increased from 32 per cent to 50 per cent. Between 1991 and 2011 women's labour force 
participation increased from 49 per cent to 58 per cent. In 2006 66 per cent of all mothers 
were in employment. See Families Commission (Komihana a Whiinau), above n 5, at 13. 
36 Garlick, above n 33, at 87. 
37 At 91. 
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the Social Security Amendment Act 1973. The DPB w~s designed to provide 
financial assistance to solo parents. However, by the nud 19'.0s the DPB was 
already under review due to conc~rns about th; snowballmg co~ts .o~ the 
increasing number of people receivmg the DPB. After 1976 th.e mdiv1dual 
DPB payments that solo parents received were reduced for up to six months to 
"discourage couples from separating too readily", and all those who applied 
for the DPB were referred to marriage counselling to see if reconciliation was 
possible.39 
In the mid 1970s children who were in need of care, state protection and 
control were governed by the Children and Young Persons Act 1974. The 
primary emphasis of this Act was to remove children from their parents and 
place them in children's homes or in foster care. Very little thought was given 
to the cultural, or other, connections the children had with their extended 
families. This remained the law until 1989 when the Children, Young Persons, 
and Their Families Act 1989 was passed and, for the first time in family 
legislation, whanau, hapu, iwi and wider family groups were recognised and 
the emphasis was placed on keeping children within their families, rather than 
removing them. A significant influence behind this substantial shift in ideology 
was the Puao-Te-Ata-Tu (Day Break) Report.40 
The mid 1970s also saw the first movement away from a fault based 
divorce system. The Domestic Actions Act 1975 removed civil actions for 
adultery and breach of promise. The family began to be seen as a group of 
individuals and not just one legal entity. For example the Matrimonial Property 
Act 1976 allowed a husband and wife to sue each other in tort.4 1 
In 1977 the Contraception Sterilisation and Abortion Act was passed. This 
Act is essentially a compromise in that it allows abortion only if the "abortion 
is immediately necessary to save the life of the patient or to prevent serious 
permanent injury to her physical or mental health" .42 The Act requires that two 
consultants must sign off any abortion.43 The legislation was not designed to 
create a system of abortion on demand, but the practical reality of the Act is 
that abortions have increased in New Zealand since the legislation came into 
force. There have been some challenges to the Act suggesting that abortions 
are being performed too readily and that the Act breaches the rights to life of 
unborn foetuses. However, thus far the courts have not given legal recognition 
to unborn foetuses and have decided that individual decisions about abortions 
are best left with the medical consultations and the supervisory committee 
involved.44 
38 Kay Goodger "Maintaining Sole Parent Families in New Zealand: An Historical Review" 
(1998) 10 Social Policy Journal of New l.ealand. 
39 Garlick, above n 33, at 98. 
40 The Maori Perspective Advisory Committee Puao-Te-Ata-Tu (Day Break): The Report Of 
The Ministerial Advisory Commillee On A Maori Perspective For The Department Of Social 
Welfare (Department Of Social Welfare, Wellington, 1988). 
41 Matrimonial Property Act 1976, s 51. 
42 Contraception Sterilisation and Abortion Act 1977, s 37. 
43 Contraception Sterilisation and Abortion Act 1977, s 29. 
44 See generally Right to Ufe New 'Zealand Inc v Rothwell (2006) I NZLR 531 (HC); Right to 
Life New 'Zealand Inc v Abortion Supervisory Committee (2008] 2 NZLR 825 (HC); Abortion 
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1980 saw the largest and most radical changes in the period of New 
Zealand's family law history under discussion here. The passing of the Family 
Courts Act 1980 established a specialist Family Court. The second appointed 
principal Family Court Judge Patrick Mahony said:45 
A major focus in modem Family Court systems is the provision of education and 
support for families, directing parental attention to the impact on their children also 
affected by what is happening to their parents, their families and themselves. In 
New Zealand's case, this involves counselling paid for by the Court, mediation, 
separate legal representation for children and the use of social work and 
psychological assessments directed in the first place at empowering parents to agree 
on good workable arrangements for the future parenting of their children. 
The Family Proceedings Act 1980 introduced a single no fault ground for what 
is now called dissolution (previously known as divorce). However the Family 
Proceedings Act 1980 still emphasised trying to reconcile the parties at the end 
of marriage. 46 
The Guardianship Act 1968 was amended in 1980 to remove any 
presumptions that the sex or gender of a parent was relevant in determining 
who could do the better parenting. Social science research became the primary 
determinant of who would receive the primary care of a child after parents 
separated.47 Concepts such as "bonding", "attachment" and the "psychological 
parent" became the primary determinants of who should have the care of a 
child when parents separated.48 
The 1980s saw much greater public and legal awareness of violence that 
occurs in the home. The Domestic Protection Act 1982 recognised that 
violence that occurs in the home is not a purely private matter, but also a 
matter that should be regulated for the public good. However, it was not until 
1987 that Police practice formally began to recognise that violence occurring 
in the home is no different from any other kind of violence that occurs in our 
society. In 1995 the Domestic Protection Act 1982 was overtaken by the 
Domestic Violence Act, which was the first piece of legislation to recognise 
same-sex and de facto relationships and to give them the same protection from 
violence as those in married relationships. 
The mid 1980s was a time of acknowledging voices that had not been 
heard before in family law. In 1984 Cabinet approved the creation of a 
Ministry of Women's Affairs, which officially opened in 1986. This Ministry 
played a significant role in ensuring that the perspective of women is heard and 
taken account of in all aspects of policy development. In 1985, through the 
determined long-term efforts of Keith Griffiths, the Adult Adoption 
Information Act came into force. This was public recognition that adopted 
Supervisory Commillee v Right to life New Zealand Inc (2011) NZCA 246, (2012) 1 NZLR 
176; and Right to Life New 'Zealand Inc v Abortion Supervisory Committee (2012) NZSC 68, 
(2012] 3 NZLR 762. 
45 PD Mahony "The Child and the Family Coun" in Stuart Birks (ed) Proceedings of Social 
Policy Forom 2002: The Child and the Family Coun: Seeking the Best Interests of the Child 
(Massey University Centre for Public Policy Evaluation, Palmerston North, 2003) at 2. 
46 Family Proceedings Act 1980, s 19. 
4 7 See Part C of this paper below. 
48 See generally A v A (1978) I NZLR 278 NZSC. 
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children may want to know about their birth family to gain knowledge about 
their own genetic and social identity. In 1986 New Zealand passed the 
Homosexual Law Reform Act 1986 that legalised homosexual acts between 
men. Up until this point men in same sex relationships were at risk of serious 
criminal penalties. 49 
While some voices were given more recognition during this time, other 
voices were not. The Status of Children Amendment Act 1987 gave legal 
recognition to people having children via the assistance of donor insemination. 
The recipient of the donation became the child's legal family and the donor 
was clearly stated to have no legal connection to the child. However, what was 
absent from the legislation was any right of the child to be able to trace the 
identity of their donor parent. This issue has only begun to be addressed since 
the passing of the Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004. 
The major contribution to family Jaw in the 1990s was the 1993 ratification 
by the New Zealand Government of the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child. This convention recognises that children have their own 
agency and rights and are therefore entitled to participate in families on their 
own terms, and be consulted and express views on matters that affect them. 50 
The globalisation of family law, whereby children and families are much 
more mobile and families are frequently formed across borders, led to the 
creation of significant international conventions. One such international 
instrument is the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects 
of International Child Abduction, which was incorporated into our 2004 Care 
of Children Act. Another is the Hague Convention of 29 May 1993 on the 
Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Inter-Country Adoption, 
which New Zealand signed in 1997. Both conventions establish central 
authorities whose role is to attempt to ensure consistent and safe practices for 
the well-being of children across countries. 
International surrogacy, whereby couples go to countries such as Thailand 
or India and have their child through a surrogate, is a current issue. Proposed 
new legislation entitled the Care of Children (Adoption and Surrogacy Law 
Reform) Amendment Bill is currently in the Parliamentary Members' Bills 
Ballot. This Bill intends to reform both adoption and surrogacy law in New 
Zealand. Importantly, in relation to surrogacy, the Bill sets out the 
"requirements with which a commissioning parent or parents must comply 
when entering into an altruistic surrogacy arrangement, and when seeking to 
have that child legally recognised as being a part of their family".51 These 
requirements include setting out guidelines for overseas altruistic surrogacy 
processes that incorporate the New Zealand adoption process. The Bill seeks to 
ensure the best interests of the child are at the heart of adoption and surrogacy 
laws. It amends the Status of Children Act 1969 to provide a prima facie 
presumption as to parenthood for surrogate and adoptive parents of children 
born overseas whose names have been entered into the birth register of the 
49 See generally Chris Brickell Mates & Lovers: A History of Gay New 'Zealand (Godwit 
Publishing, Auckland, 2008). 
50 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, art 12. 
51 Proposed Care of Children (Adoption and Surrogacy Law Refonn) Amendment Bill, 
Explanatory Note. 
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overseas country where the child was born, or when a foreign court has made a 
parentage order in favour of the surrogate/adoptive parents. 52 
A greater focus on economic equality and recognition of children's rights 
emerged in the 21st century. The first major change was the amendment to the 
Property (Relationships) Act 1976 in 2001.53 The Matrimonial Property Act 
1976 was ahead of its time with its strong presumption of equal sharing of the 
family home and family chattels upon the dissolution of a marriage and its 
weaker presumption of equal sharing of the rest of what was called 
"matrimonial property". The 2001 amendment to the newly named Property 
(Relationships) Act 1976 strengthened the presumption of equal sharing to an 
entitlement to equal sharing of all relationship property upon the dissolution of 
a marriage or de facto relationship. More radically, it also recognised that in 
order to achieve equality of result, the party who has been economically 
disadvantaged by taking on home and childcare roles should be given more 
than 50 per cent of the total relationship property. The amendment also 
enabled a much wider range of relationships to be able to claim equal shares of 
their property as the legislation formally recognised de facto and same-sex 
relationships. De facto and same sex-couples were also now able to claim 
spousal maintenance from each other under the Family Proceedings Act 1980. 
The broadening recognition of persons who came under the umbrella of the 
legal family was further reinforced by the Relationships (Statutory References) 
Act 2005 which extended most of the rights and obligations of married couples 
52 Section 5 of the Status of Children Act 1969 currently states: 
S Presumptions as to parenthood 
(l} A child born to a woman during her marriage, or within 10 months after the 
marriage has been dissolved by death or otherwise, shall, in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary, be presumed to be the child of its mother and her 
husband, or former husband, as the case may be. 
(2) Every question of fact that arises in applying subsection (l} shall be decided on a 
balance of probabilities. 
(3) This section shall apply in respect of every child, whether born before or after the 
commencement of this Act, and whether born in New Zealand or not, and whether 
or not his father or mother has ever been domiciled in New Zealand. 
Clause 8 of the proposed Care of Children (Adoption and Surrogacy Law Reform) 
Amendment Bill 2012 would add the following two subsections to s 5 of the Status of 
Children Act 1969: 
5(4) If a child has been born in a foreign country, and the names of the parent or 
parents for that child have been entered in a register relating to births in that 
country, a certified copy of that entry purporting to be signed or sealed in 
accordance with the law of that foreign country shall be prima facie evidence that 
in New Zealand, the person or persons named as the parent or parents are the 
parent or parents of the child. 
5(5) If a child has been born in a foreign country, and a coun or a judicial or public 
authority in that country has made an order as to the parentage of the child, a 
certified copy of that order purporting to be signed or sealed in accordance with the 
law of that foreign country shall be prima facie evidence that in New Zealand, the 
person or persons named in the order as the parent or parents are the parent or 
parents of the child. 
53 For more information about the 2001 amendments to the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 
see Part D of this article below. 
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to de facto and same-sex couples. The one notable exception was that no 
statutory recognition was provided for civil union, de facto and same-sex 
couples to adopt a child. The Courts have given de facto couples this right, but 
this has not yet been extended to civil union couples or same-sex couples. 54 
The Care of Children Act 2004 sets out a number of principles which 
emphasise that children are members of, not just their immediate family, but 
also their wider families, that decisions need to be made within a child's sense 
of time and ensure the child's safety is at the heart of any decision made about 
their care. The Act gives children their own lawyer to ensure that their views 
are represented. There is also an emphasis in the Act for both parents to be 
regularly involved in the child's life. 
3. Looking to the future 
Family law in New Zealand currently faces a significant review of the Family 
Court, which seems intent on reducing the roles of lawyers in family disputes 
and relying more on family dispute resolution services. This has the potential 
to weaken the strength of New Zealand's family law system and may result in 
some children and vulnerable parties losing their voice in family law 
disputes. ss 
C. The Conundrum of Deciding What is Best 
At the heart of parenting and guardianship disputes (which constitute the 
largest single category of applications filed in the Family Court)56 lies the 
familiar notion that the best interests of the child are paramount; this is 
54 See generally Re AMM [2010] NZFl..R. 629 (HC). If the Marriage (Definition of Marriage) 
Amendment Bill (39-2) as reported from the Government Administration Committee (which 
past its second reading on 13 March 2013) is ultimately passed, this will allow married 
couples regardless of their sex, sexual orientation or gender identity to adopt children. As the 
Bill's commentary states: 
If the bill were to pass, il would make consequential amendments to the Adoption Act 
1955 that would have the effect of enabling married same-sex couples to adopt children 
lawfully, as any married couple may do. 
We note that currently under the law a homosexual or transgender person may legally 
adopt a child, but same-sex couples may not. Such a position seems absurd. The 
amendments we recommend will ensure that married couples are eligible lo adopt, 
regardless of the gender of the adoptive parents. 
We note that many families already exist which comprise children and same-sex or 
transgender parents. However, both parents do not have access to the full range of legal 
rights that married heterosexual couples have. We consider that allowing same-sex 
couples to marry would grant an appropriate legal right to those families who are already 
raising children. 
For more information about sex, sexual orientation and gender identity terminology see 
Ministry of Social Development, above n 6. 
55 For more information about the Family Court Review see Family Court Proceedings Reform 
Bill (90-1 ). 
56 According lo 2012 Family Court Statistics such disputes represented 38.9 per cent of the total 
Family Court workload in 2011. Applications under the Children, Young Persons and Their 
Families Act 1989 (16.8 per cent) were the next largest category. 
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sometimes referred to as the paramountcy principle.57 Accordingly, if any such 
case proceeds to a hearing, the final outcome will be determined not by the 
application of preordained rules but by the exercise of a value judgment from a 
Family Court judge who is directed bli statute to treat each case in an 
individualised, fact-specific manner. 8 Consistency, certainty, and 
predictability, all the qualities typically associated with and expected of the 
'rule of law' doctrine, are not exactly trademark features of decision-making 
here. The judge appears to have been entrusted with an unfettered discretion. 
There are other areas of New Zealand family law, such as child support and 
relationship property, where it can be said Parliament deliberately set out to 
eliminate judicial discretion in favour of prescriptive rules.59 Even within the 
Care of Children Act 2004 context, the self-contained code in ss 58-61A, 
prescribing how issues of violence are to be dealt with, attenuates the 
paramountcy principle.60 Section 4(7) unequivocally subordinates that 
principle in any case concerning international child abduction between Hague 
Convention contracting states. Nevertheless, it must be said coherent principles 
of law are notable primarily for their exceptionality in proceedings under the 
Care of Children Act 2004. 
1. Paramountcy principle and its implications. 
Questions abound over the scope and application of the Care of Children Act 
2004, which provides that the "welfare and best interests of the child must be 
the first and paramount consideration" in proceedings about children.61 While 
laudable in its aspiration, the paramountcy principle is highly problematic in 
its application. Although purporting to provide a single, unifying, child-centric 
philosophy for the guidance of judges, lawyers, and parties, the principle, at 
least in its pure unqualified form, is simply devoid of any meaningful legal 
content. 
Unsurprisingly, New Zealand judges have characterised cases involving the 
application of the paramountcy principle as "notoriously difficult".62 For 
instance, is the child's welfare to be evaluated from a short-term perspective, 
or a long-term one, or something in-between?63 In an age of moral relativism 
57 Care of Children Act 2004, s 4(1 ). 
58 Care of Children Act 2004, s 4(2). 
59 The current relevant statutes are the Child Support Act 1991 and the Property (Relationship) 
Act 1976. In respect of economic disparity awards, however, a wide judicial discretion has 
been conferred pursuant to s 15 of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976. 
60 See the reasoning of Winkelmann Jin Blom v Mackay [2005) NZFLR 1036 (HC), in relation 
to the equivalent s l 6B of the Guardianship Act 1968. Sections S8-61A of the Care of 
Children Act 2004 are, as at the time of writing, undergoing governmental review and a 
radical proposal for change can be found in cl4 of the Family Court Proceedings Reform Bill 
(90-1). 
61 See Care of Children Act 2004, s 4(1). 
62 See K v G [2005) 3 NZLR 104, [2004) NZFLR 11 OS (HC) at [20) per Gendall and France JJ, 
and R v S [Guardianship] [2004) NZFLR 207, (2003) 22 FRNZ 1017 (HC) at [l] per Heath 
and Priestley JJ. 
63 A question raised in his classic article Robert H Mnookin "Child Custody Adjudication: 
Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy'' (1975) 39 Law and Contemporary Problems 
226 at 260. 
656 New 'Zealand Universities Law Review Vol 25 
and uncertainty, what exactly constitutes a 'good' childhood? Are the 'best 
interests' of a child better met by a 'happy' childhood or rather by one of some 
hardship and unhappiness that leads to later resilience in adulthood?64 Then, on 
a different tack, does the paramountcy principle mean the child's welfare 
invariably trumps all other considerations, irrespective of the strength of those 
other considerations, or does it simply mean the child's welfare is to be 
accorded more weight than any other in a non-exhaustive list of all relevant 
considerations, but that those other considerations could singly or in 
combination outweigh it?65 
Moreover, as presently constructed, the non-exhaustive list of principles 
contained in s 5 of the Care of Children Act 2004, are both congested and 
diffuse.66 New Zealand appellate courts have consistently and emphatically 
eschewed any possibility of adopting presumptive weightings or starting 
points.67 
The sheer indeterminacy of the scope and content of the paramountcy 
principle is unfortunately its most defining characteristic. The family judge 
must fall back on his or her personal judgment and guesswork rather than on 
premeditated legal reasoning. In turn, the appellate courts, whilst given a 
reasonably free hand on the current New Zealand approach,68 find themselves 
in no better position to make legally-grounded decisions than first instance 
courts.69 There is no doctrine of stare decisis undergirding the paramountcy 
principle. 
All the emphasis on individualised justice means that the philosophical and 
psychological bearings of the individual judge become crucial in any decision-
making under the Care of Children Act 2004. Thus, in a recent address to the 
New Zealand Family Court Judges' triennial conference, Black U pointed out 
that the discretion in family law requires the judge to put something of herself 
or himself into every decision made,70 and various New Zealand judges have 
admitted that a variability in outcomes is the natural consequence of this 
personalising of decision-making. Former Principal Family Court Judge 
64 See Andrea Charlow "Awarding Custody: The Best Interests of the Child and Other Fictions" 
(1987) 5 Yale Law and Policy Review 267 at 268. 
65 Consider the interesting analysis of Richard Chisholm "The Paramount Consideration: 
Children's Interests in Family Law" (2002) 16 AJFL at 87. The author differentiates the 
"weak" and "strong" views of the paramountcy principle. 
66 In 2012 the Cabinet Social Policy Committee recommended that the s 5 principles should be 
re-ordered and simplified. See Office of the Minister of Justice "Family Court Review -
Proposals for Refonn" (Office of the Minister of Justice, Wellington, August 2012) at (75). 
This is reflected in cl 4 of the Family Court Proceedings Refonn Bill (90-1). 
67 Most recently, and notably, by the Supreme Court in Kacem v Bashir [2010) NZSC 112, 
[2011) 2 NZLR 1. 
68 Following the Supreme Court judgment in Austin, Nicols & Co Inc v Stichti11g Lodestar 
[2007) NZSC 103, [2008) 2 NZLR 141 the appellate courts must reach their own conclusions 
on any questions of fact, degree and value judgment. In the context of Care of Children Act 
2004 proceedings see C v LT [2009) NZFLR 1098 (HC) at (32]. 
69 K v G, above 62, at [20]. See the comment of Gendall and France JJ. 
70 Lady Justice Black ''Does it Help to Have Rules" (paper presented to New Zealand Family 
Court Judges Conference, Wellington, 4 August 201l) at 13. Intriguingly, legislative 
recognition of the importance of "personality" in the adjudicating process is found in s 5(2) 
of the Family Courts Act 1980. 
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Boshier, for instance, extra-judicially conceded that the frequently differing 
decisions on relocation are explicable and dependent on the ·~udge's 
philosophical view on the raft of issues that relocation cases throw up".71 In a 
rarely evidenced passage of judicial self-reflection, the Court of Appeal in D v 
S 72 specifically attributed the differing assessments evident in relocation cases 
to the influence of the judges' own perspectives and experiences.73 The judges 
certainly find themselves troubled by the absence of rules and legal yardsticks 
in child law,74 and they are still left, as John Eekelaar memorably said, "cruelly 
exposed".75 
Quite apart from the difficulties created for the judges, the wide judicial 
discretion still extant in child law is hardly conducive to the engendering of 
public, professional, or academic respect. Mark Henaghan has thus frequently 
suggested that there is an element of a "lottery" to decision-making in New 
Zealand relocation law76 and, with reference to Australian family Jaw, Peter 
McManus has argued that clients in the family law discretionary system may 
well feel disappointed and alienated by the "dismayingly broad" discretion and 
the apparently arbitrary decision-making.77 One wonders too if the suggestion 
that Australian family law enjoyed a low reputation in legal professional 
practice and the academy78 could be explicable in part by the perceptions of 
palm-tree justice intrinsic to the broad discretions. 
2. The juristic consequences of a lack of predictability. 
The New Zealand High Court has recently reiterated that any judicial search 
for relevant precedent would be "fruitless'', and that attempts to analyse factual 
similarities and differences, or reconcile outcomes, were likely to lead the 
judge into error.79 The "sobering" reality is that frequently no 'right' or 
'wrong' outcome exists,80 and the very essence of discretion entails a range of 
71 Peter Boshier "Have Judges been missing the point and allowing relocation too readily" 
(2010) 6 NZFLJ 334 at 334. 
72 D v S (2002] NZFLR 116, (2001) 21FRNZ331 (CA). 
73 At [37]. 
74 See Black, above n 70, at 2 and 13. 
75 See John Eekelaar "'Trust the Judges: How Far Should Family Law Go" (1984) 47 MLR 593 
at596. 
76 See Mark Henaghan "Relocation Cases - the rhetoric and the reality of a child's best interests 
- a view from the bottom of the world" (2011) 23 CFLQ 226 at 241 and Mark Henaghan 
"Doing the COCAcobana - using the Care of Children Act for your child clients" (2008) 6 
NZFLJ 53 at 56. 
77 Peter McManus "Rules and Discretion in Family Law" (PhD thesis, University of 
Queensland, 2005) at 70-71. 
78 See John Dewar 'The Normal Chaos of Family Law'' (1998) 61 MLR 467 at 469 and John H 
Wade "The Professional Status of Family Law Practice in Australia" (1985) 8 UNSWU 183 
at 183-184 and 202. 
79 See the observation of Winkelmann J in the relocation case LH v PH [Relocatio11] (2007] 
NZFLR 737 (HC) at [39]. To similar effect, see S v L [Relocatio11] (2008] NZFLR 237, 
(2007) 26 FRNZ 684 (HC) at (25) per Harrison J. 
80 As noted by Priestley J in Brown v Argyll (2006) NZFLR 705, (2006) 25 FRNZ 383 (HC) at 
(38]. 
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differing assessments and decisions being legitimately open to the Judge. 
81 
As 
the Supreme Court expressly acknowledged in Kacem v Bashir
8 
a lack of 
predictability in child law cases is "inevitable". 
83 
That unpredictability, in tum, increases the likelihood of litigation in child 
disputes.84 For a hopeful party (perhaps, most especially, a self-represented 
litigant) is surely encouraged to try out his or her chances in court, and become 
emboldened to persist until he or she gets, as Henaghan puts it, " ... a judge 
who looks at the facts of the case the way the person wants them to". 85 Quite 
perversely, the bypassing of principled rules in favour of an aspirational child-
centric ideal has positively incentivised litigation, with all the concomitant 
dangers to the best interests and welfare of the individual child that are thereby 
entailed. 
3. Attempts to shun the appearance of unfettered discretion: Reframing the 
judicial task 
It has always been apprehended that the core task of a judge is to make 
definitive findings of law but, obviously enough, fact-finding is also a 
traditional and accepted judicial function. Perhaps for this reason, the judges 
may attempt to present and shape the discretion bestowed on them under the 
paramountcy principle into a more comfortable mould of evidence evaluating. 
For instance, the Supreme Court in Kacem v Bashir propounded the view that 
the Court was not in fact exercising a discretion, but rather was " ... making an 
assessment and decision based on an evaluation of the evidence".86 Such 
language is admittedly comforting, but it must remain questionable whether 
the reality of making a decision on a child's future welfare and best interests 
can be truly designated as evidentially based when the requisite evaluation of 
well-being in the future can, in truth, never be grounded on demonstrable, 
proven facts. Perhaps the rhetoric employed does not entirely convince. 
4. Attempts to shun the appearance of unfettered discretion: Relying on social 
science 
Consistent with the endeavour to inject an appearance of objectivity into 
decision-making on a child's best interests, and the need for iudges to be seen 
to base their decisions on "evidence" rather than "intuition", 7 the Courts will 
often seek to rely upon a psychological report under s 133 of the Care of 
Children Act 2004. Provision of an expert opinion, of a purportedly scientific 
kind, could, as with the overarching language of evidence-evaluation, provide 
81 D v S (2002] NZFLR 116, (2001) 21FRNZ331 (CA) at (37]. 
82 Kacem v Bashir (2010] NZSC 112, (2011) 2 NZLR 1. 
83 At (35). 
84 As accepted in the report by Nicola Taylor, Megan Gollop and Marie Henaghan "Relocation 
Following Parental Separation: The Welfare and Best Interests of Children" (Law 
Foundation, Dunedin, 2010) at 144. 
85 Mark Henaghan "Discretion, Status and Money: The Essence of Family Law in New 
Zealand" (2011) International Survey of Family Law 281at300. 
86 Kacem v Bashir, above n 82, at [35]. 
87 See the dictum of Hardie Boys J in M v Y [ 1994) l NZLR 527, (1994] NZFLR 1 (CA) at 11. 
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a cloak of legitimacy for what would otherwise emerge as a starkly personal 
value judgment. 
These s 133 reports, however, unfortunately rest on shaky legal and 
psychological foundations. First of all, undue judicial reliance on social 
science poses its own threat to notions of rule of law.88 Secondly, and quite 
remarkably, there seems to be little science to supr,ort the use of psychological 
reports in disputes over the care of children, 9 and it is quite possible 
psychologists enjoy no special expertise in predicting the future behaviour and 
development of either the child or parents. Certainly social science research 
into the future welfare of children seems, at best, to provide only probabilistic 
predictive statements of minimal value in any particular case,9() and, as the 
2010 New Zealand Research Report into Relocation observed of the then 
available relocation research, "[t]he research findings are widely variable 
depending on the methodological approach utilised".91 The s 133 reports, 
which may become less common in the future,92 are seemingly themselves 
essentially subjective evaluations. 
5. Identifying limits to the discretion 
It is a foundational principle of judicial review that the ambit of any statutory 
discretion is inherently limited by its statutory boundaries, irrespective of the 
breadth of the statutory wording conferring it.93 As with any other statutory 
discretion, a Family Court judge exercising discretion granted under the Care 
of Children Act 2004 must therefore take into account all mandatory relevant 
matters, and disregard all irrelevant matters.94 Here, at last, some constraints 
over discretionary decision-making in child law may be found to exist. 
Certain considerations are expressly deemed irrelevant to the exercise of 
the discretion conferred under s 4(1) of the Care of Children Act 2004. For 
instance, issues of the parent's gender and conduct must be excluded from the 
judge's evaluation.95 Other considerations, such as the child's views, are 
88 As pointed out by Ruth Deech ''Divorce Law and Empirical Studies" (1990) 106 LQR 229 at 
233-234. 
89 See Robert E Emery, Randy K Otto and William T O'Donohue "A Critical Assessment of 
Child Custody Evaluations: Limited Science and a Hawed System" (2005) 6 Psychological 
Science in the Public Interest l at 7-9 and Ira Turkat "On the Limitations of Child-Custody 
Evaluations" (2005) 42 Court Review 8. 
90 The point made, for example, by both William G. Austin "Relocation, Research, and 
Forensic Evaluation, Part l : Effects of Residential Mobility of Children of Divorce" (2008) 
46 Family Court Review 137 at 138 and Kenneth Waldron "A Review of Social Science 
Research on Post Divorce Relocation" (2005) 19 American Academy Matrimonial Lawyers 
337 at 344. 
91 See Black, above n 70, at 9. 
92 See the 2012 Cabinet Social Policy Committee proposals by the Office of the Minister of 
Justice, above n 66 at [120] and cl 22 of the Family Court Proceedings Reform Bill (90-1). 
93 See Unison Networks Lid v Commerce Commission [2007] NZSC 74, [2008] I NZLR 42 at 
[53]. 
94 See the celebrated judgment of Lord Greene MR in Associated Provincial Picture Houses 
Lid v Wednesbury Corporation [1947] EWCA Civ I, [1948] l KB 223. 
95 Care of Children Act 2004, ss 4(3) and (4). Acts of violence do, of course, carry specific 
legal consequences. See now cl 4 of the Family Court Proceedings Reform Bill (90-1) that 
would modify the presumption in relation to conduct. 
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rendered explicitly mandatory for the judge to take into accounl,96 and any 
failure to do so immediately renders the ensuing decision jurisdictionally 
suspect.97 Very interestingly, the courts are also now beginning to identify 
matters that are implicitly mandatory in the exercise of Family Court 
discretion. For instance, following some strong hints uttered by the Court of 
Appeal in Tavita v Minister of /mmigration,98 it is now virtually certain that 
the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child is an implicitly 
mandatory consideration in the exercise of any statutory discretion that 
impacts on children.99 
With regards to the Treaty of Waitangi, Cooke P also intimated that if a 
decision touched on matters covered by the Treaty, such as 'taonga', then in 
order for a decision-maker to act reasonably he or she would need to take the 
Treaty into account. 100 In other words, the Treaty can be viewed as an 
implicitly mandatory consideration whenever 'taonga', including intangible 
cultural values, is in issue. 101 Family organisation falls within the definition of 
'taonga', and Gallen and Goddard JJ thus importantly declared: 102 
. . . we take the view that all Acts dealing with the status, future and control of 
children, are to be interpreted as coloured by the principles of the Treaty of 
Waitangi. Family organisation may be said to be included among those things 
which the Treaty was intended to preserve and protect. 
In judicial review parlance, it could therefore be said that it would be an 'abuse 
of discretionary power' if a Family Court Judge, when exercising his or her 
statutory discretion in relation to a Maori child, failed to take into account the 
principles of the Treaty. And, in relation to a child of any ethnicity, it would 
similarly be an 'abuse of discretion' if the judge was to fail to have regard to 
relevant provisions of the United Nations Convention. 
The existence of these implicitly and explicitly mandatory considerations 
in the Care of Children Act 2004, and of the various matters that can be 
deemed irrelevant to the exercise of judicial powers, has created some 
potentially valuable legal boundaries. Without some significant prior 
qualification, it would be a little misleading to describe the discretionary 
powers of the judges under the paramountcy principle as 'unfettered'.1°3 Yet, 
96 Care of Children Act 2004, s 6. 
97 Brown v Argyll (2006) NZFLR 705, (2006) 25 FRNZ 383 (CA) at (45) per Priestley J. 
98 Tavira v Minister of J111111igratio11 (1994] 2 NZLR 257, (1994) NZFLR 97 (CA). 
99 See Re An Unbom Child (No I) (2003) NZFLR 344 (HC) at (181 and [70(b)], P v K (2003) 
(2003] 2 NZLR 787, NZFLR 489 (HC) at (72] and Ye v Minister of lmmigratio11 (2009] 
NZSC 76, (2010] l NZLR 104. 
100 Ngai Tahu Miiori Trust Board v Director-Ge11eral of Conservatio11 (1995] 3 NZLR 553 at 
560. 
101 The High Court in Bleakley v Environmental Risk Management Authority (2001) 3 NZLR 
213 held at (59] that "taonga" extends to intangible cultural values. 
102 Barton-Prescott v Director-Ge11era/ of Social Welfare (1997] 3 NZLR 179, (1997] NZFLR 
642 (HC) at 184. 
103 In CAA v AAM [Pare11ti11g order] (2012) NZFLR 109 (FC) Judge Wills did describe the 
discretion under s 48 as an "unfettered" discretion, bu1 immedialely qualified this statement 
by observing at (14) that it must exercised in " ... a manner consistent with the Act's purposes 
and with regard to the principles identified in the Act." 
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while a degree of 'Law' can be seen to subsist in cases falling within the 
purview of the venerable and often venerated paramountcy principle, the 
challenge and desire for a more principled approach to future decision-making 
relating to children undoubtedly remains. 104 
D. Who Gets the Money? 
The last 50 years have been momentous for family law, not least when it 
comes to property and finance. Over those five decades, the fundamental 
approach to family property changed and, along with other areas of family law, 
the notes of equal treatment and inclusion have prevailed. Rather less 
pronounced is the place of children: their welfare is not the paramount 
consideration. 
Precisely 50 years ago, the Matrimonial Property Act 1963 was passed 
along with its companion the Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1963. These were 
marks of the reforming Minister of Justice, Ralph Hanan. While the latter Act 
contained rules relating to the matrimonial home following divorce, the focus 
for now must be on the first of the two Acts. 
The Matrimonial Property Act 1963 ("the 1963 Act") represented a radical 
shift from the past. The previous law, in effect, treated husbands and wives as 
strangers, applying the law of common law and equity that governed 
commercial and other dealings. At the time, the presence of women in the 
workforce was low, and property interests by and large favoured men. Some 
things ameliorated this position. First, divorced women could get maintenance 
payments, sometimes for life. Secondly, the Joint Family Homes Act 1950, 
revised by the Joint Family Homes Act 1964,105 provided attractive incentives 
for couples to "settle" their homes under the Act on the basis of joint 
ownership. In its day - the post-war years - this Act was very popular because 
it was tied to cheap government finance for housing. More importantly, in 
hindsight, it played an important part in changing attitudes more generally to 
the way in which the law treated married couples and their property. 
The 1963 Act turned the tables on a wider basis. It allowed the courts to 
make orders that overrode strict legal and equitable interests. 106 The basis for 
an order under the 1963 Act was the contribution of the parties to the property, 
but contribution to property could include the non-financial ones to home and 
family.107 Thus, it was no longer just a matter of money, or what Woodhouse J 
referred to beguilingly in a later judgment as "the hypnotic influence of 
104 See Henaghan 's proposal for a prioritised 'discipline' for relocation cases in Henaghan 
"Relocation Cases", above n 76, at 241. 
105 Almost certainly, it will be repealed by the Joint Family Homes Repeal Bill (2-1) 2012. 
106 Section 5(3) of the 1963 Act. 
107 Section 6(1) of the 1963 Act, in referring to contributions, stated "whether in the form of 
money payments, services, prudent management, or otherwise howsoever". The Privy 
Council in Haldane v Haldane [1976) 2 NZLR 715, [1976] 3 WLR 760 (PC) gave this a 
broad meaning, especially in relation to the tracing of domestic activities to property other 
than the home. The Matrimonial Property Amendment Act 1968 added subsection (lA) to 
section 6, stating that an order could be made notwithstanding that the spouse had "made no 
contribution to the property in the form of money payments or that [the] contribution in any 
other form was of a usual and not an extraordinary character". 
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money". 108 The Act did not allow an order to defeat the parties' common 
intention109 but misconduct was not relevant if it was "not related to the 
acquisition of the property in dispute or to its extent or value". 110 
While the 1963 Act made strides in the direction of the recognition of non-
monetary contributions and gender equity, it proved far from satisfactory. 111 It 
relied mostly on judicial discretion because of the inherent imprecision in 
evaluating the broadly based concept of contributions, and the share that wives 
got in property was often random. The 1963 Act represented a stepping stone 
to a much more concerted and conceptually pure regime. A Bill introduced by 
Dr Martyn Finlay, the Labour Minister of Justice, was shepherded through 
Parliament by the new National Government Minister, David Thomson, 
illustrating that the legislation had bi-partisan backing. One of the basic 
principles of the new legislation, the Matrimonial Property Act 1976 ("the 
1976 Act"), was equal division of matrimonial property, reflecting the equal 
but different contributions that both spouses make to "the marriage 
partnership". It was described as "a new deal", and embraced "comparable 
sharing - the fairest approach". 112 
The 1976 Act excluded "separate property" from the division rules, that is 
property that is personal and not related to the marriage, and incorporated 
some exceptions to equal sharing: where the marriage was of short duration, 
where extraordinary circumstances rendered equal sharing "repugnant" to 
justice, and, in relation to property other than the home and chattels, where one 
party had made a clearly greater contribution to the marriage than the other. 
The 1976 Act expressly defined contributions to relate to the married life 
rather than to property and included a presumption that monetary contributions 
were not to be given priority over non-monetary ones. 
The 1976 Act is sometimes dubbed a "deferred community" system. 113 
This is redolent of the European "community property" systems that, in broad 
terms, give both spouses equal rights to the property of the "community" upon 
marriage. Under the New Zealand legislation, entitlements are generally 
108 Reid v Reid [1979] l NZLR 572, (1979) SMPC 298 (CA) at 581. 
I 09 Section 6(2) of the 1963 Act. 
110 Section 6A, as added by the Matrimonial Property Amendment Act 1968. Incongruously, 
general misconduct could be taken into account under Part VIlI of the Matrimonial 
Proceedings Act 1963 in relation to the home. 
111 WM Mansell "Whi1her Matrimonial Property?" (1971) 4 NZULR 271. 
112 Matrimonial Property - Comparable Sharing All Explalllltion of the Matrimonial Property 
Bill 1975 (Government Printer, Wellington, 1975) published under the name of the Minister, 
al 3 and 7. For more background to the 1976 Act, see JK Mclay "The Matrimonial Property 
Act, 1976" in The Matrimonial Property Act 1976: papers presented at the Legal Research 
Foundation Inc. seminar : 2nd February 1977 (Auckland University Legal Research 
Foundation, Auckland, 1977) at 7. 
113 Pauline Vaver ''Notes on the Matrimonial Property Act 1976" in 11ie Matrimonial Property 
Act 1976: papers presented at the Legal Research Foundation Inc. seminar: 2nd February 
1977 (Auckland University Legal Research Foundation, Auckland, 1977) 55 at 55. See also 
AH Angelo and WR Atkin "A Conceptual and Structural Overview of the Matrimonial 
Property Act 1976" (1977) 7 NZULR 237 and Bill Atkin "Family Property" in Mark 
Henaghan and Bill Atkin (eds) Family Law Policy in New Zealand (4th ed, LexisNexis, 
Wellington, 2013) 209 at 211. 
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deferred until separation or, with more recent changes, until the death of one of 
the parties. 
The 1976 Act altered the legal understanding of relationships. No longer 
was this understanding dominated by the husband and focused on money. 
Partnership and gender equality became the new paradigm. In some respects, 
when the legislation was passed, the typical model at the back of people's 
minds may have been the income-earning husband and the home-bound wife, 
but the law was drafted in a prescient way that provided for both this model 
and future developments such as the much greater participation of women in 
the paid workforce. 
On the other hand, the Act included only certain kinds of domestic 
relationships. While the original Bill included de facto relationships, they were 
dropped out after the 1975 election and change of government. Same-sex 
relationships were barely on the horizon: the law on homosexual relations had 
not even been decriminalised. The notion of family in the Act was also a 
largely pakeha one: husband, wife and (probably) children. The Maori 
renaissance of the 1980s had yet to occur and thinking about family as whiinau 
was still several years off. The only acknowledgment of tikanga Maori was in 
the exclusion of Maori land from the Act. 114 
What about children?115 Under s 26(1) of the 1976 Act regard must be had 
towards the interests of the children, 116 and the court is given a seemingly 
sweeping power to "settle" relationship property for the benefit of the children. 
The reality is, however, that the children do not get a regular share of the 
property; instead it almost invariably goes to the parents. The power to settle 
has rarely been used, the view being taken that the equal division rule should 
not be upset. Usually fairly extreme circumstances are required, for example 
where one of the parents has abandoned the family and is not fulfilling support 
obligations to the children. 117 So, the Act was and remains largely adult-
focused. 
Despite some question marks, the 1976 Act worked tolerably well and no 
storm of criticism emerged. To some extent, its success may be due to the case 
law that dealt with key issues within just a few years of the Act's coming into 
force. One of the dominant figures behind these cases was Woodhouse J, who 
embraced the principles of the Act without demur. This is less true of some 
other great judges such as Cooke J (as he then was) 118 and High Court judges 
of note such as Mahon J. 119 In short, these early cases reinforced the equal 
division rules at the heart of the Act. Examples of such cases include Martin v 
114 See Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 6. 
115 See generally A SkeUem Children and the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 (LLM thesis, 
Victoria University of Wellington, 2012). 
116 This was also in the "long title" of the original Act, and now found in s lM(c), Property 
(Relationships) Act 1976. 
117 See Bill Atkin and others Fisher on Matrimonial and Relationship Property (looseleaf, 
LexisNexis, Wellington) at [18.84). 
118 In Reid v Reid [1979) l NZLR 572, (1979) SMPC 298 (CA) Cooke 1 would have divided the 
property 75!25 as against the majority's 60/40, a result that would have been far less 
favourable to the wife. 
119 See Baddeley v Baddeley (1978) l MPC 10 (SC). 
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Martin, 120 which took a narrow view of extraordinary circumstances and 
marriages of short duration, Haldane v Haldane, 121 which took a generous 
approach to superannuation, and Reid v Reid, 122 which kept a tight rein on the 
ability to escape equal division for assets other than the home and chattels (the 
old s 15) and which rejected arguments that would have seen assets acquired 
during the marriage slip outside of the matrimonial property pool. 
In 1988, the then Minister of Justice, Geoffrey Palmer, set up a Working 
Group to review the Act. 123 Several major issues still had to be dealt with, 
namely how to provide for widowed parties and de facto couples, both 
sidelined when the 1976 Act was passed. Apart from a number of more 
technical matters, a newer critique was made of the Act. It was argued that it 
provided for equality in theory but this did not translate into reality because 
husbands tended to leave their marriages in a much more secure economic 
position. Wives, a fortiori if they were primary caregivers of children, were 
often reduced to surviving on a benefit. 
Although it took an unnecessarily long time, the issues were addressed in 
the ma~or package of reforms passed in 2001. This is not the place to go into 
details 24 but, as far as inclusiveness is concerned, de facto couples and 
widowed persons are now treated, for most purposes, on the same footing as 
married couples (although most widowed persons will not need to use the Act). 
The key term "de facto relationship" includes same-sex couples and, with the 
passage of the Civil Union Act in 2004, civil unions are also included. With 
respect to equality, the rule in the old s 15 which allowed arguments about 
contributions to trump equal division was abolished. Of even greater 
significance was the introduction of a new s 15.125 This gives the court a 
discretion to award compensation for disparities in earning power that can be 
traced to the parties' cohabitation. In other words, a party's disadvantage when 
incomes are compared becomes a significant factor in determining property 
entitlements. While the operation of this new form of compensation, especially 
calculating the quantum, gave rise to a lot of litigation and uncertainty, the 
Court of Appeal decision in X v X [Economic disparity} 126 appears to have 
enabled most disputes to be settled. 
2001 is therefore a landmark year for the development of the principles of 
family property law, but that law remains largely mono-cultural and directed 
towards the interests of adults. The same is largely true of the law of 
maintenance and, ironically, child support. The starting point for these topics 
120 Martin v Martin [1979] l NZLR 97 (CA). 
121 Haldane v Haldane (1981] 1NZLR554, (1981) 1NZFLR43 (CA). 
122 Reid v Reid (1979] l NZLR 572, (1979) SMPC 298 (CA), affirmed by Reid v Reid (1982] l 
NZLR 147 (PC). The decision in Reid on acquisitions led to an amendment to the Act but the 
underlying premise that property acquired for the benefit of the parties was to be classified as 
matrimonial property endures in a clarified form. 
123 Repon of the Working Group on Matrimonial Property and Family Protection (Ministry of 
Justice, Wellington 1988). 
124 See Bill Atkin and Wendy Parker Relationship Property iti New Z,ealand (2nd ed. 
LexisNexis, Wellington, 2009). 
125 See also s ISA, a companion section, which is very rarely used. 
126 Xv X [Eco11omic disparity] [2009] NZCA 399, (2010] 1 NZLR 601. 
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in a 50 year retrospective is the Domestic Proceedings Act 1968. It provided 
for the maintenance of wives, husbands and children, the grounds for husbands 
being more constrained than those for wives. De facto partners were ignored, 
although orders could be made to assist unmarried mothers. 127 The Family 
Proceedings Act 1980 consolidated the law, providing rules that were the same 
for husbands and wives but distinguishing between separated and divorced 
couples. It was not until the 2001 reforms that de facto partners were included 
and linked to the rules for divorced persons. Civil union partners are treated 
the same as married couples. 
Maintenance recognises the mutuality of relationships and obligations that 
can endure, at least for a transitional period, beyond their separation. In this 
sense, maintenance, which has a long historical provenance, overrides legal 
and equitable interests in money. While it now treats differing kinds of 
relationships in much the same way and does not distinguish on the grounds of 
gender, it does not purport to equalise the financial positions of the parties. 
The law on financial assistance for children is dominated by the Child 
Support Act 1991. Space does not permit more than a superficial gloss of the 
Jaw. 128 It shifted child maintenance from the courts to the Inland Revenue 
Department, which determines financial obligations according to a formula 
that works well with computers. It has the great advantage of certainty but, 
because not all situations fit the standard pattern, it is possible for either the 
payer or the recipient to seek a "departure" from the formula. When the Act 
first came into force, it created havoc and the courts were deluged with 
departure applications. Although this all settled down after a while, the Act has 
been reviewed and a Bill is before Parliament at the time of writing that will 
make significant changes to the formula and various other rules.129 
From an overall perspective, we can note that the welfare of the child is not 
an object of the Child Support Act 1991 despite suggestions that it should be. 
Further, a child cannot seek child support, again despite suggestions that this 
should change. Although a recipient may be anyone who has care of the child, 
the Act is essentially based on a traditional family model. The court has power 
to declare someone a step-parent for the purposes of the Act and thus 
potentially be a liable parent130 but this happens extremely rarely. Nothing 
however turns on the marital status of the parents. In sum, the Child Support 
Act 1991 is traditional in its ethos, but modern in its form of delivery. 
E. Conclusion 
New Zealand families have changed significantly over the past 50 years. In an 
attempt to keep pace with these societal changes New Zealand family Jaw has 
127 Section 53 of the Domeslic Proceedings Act 1968, now found in ss 78-81 of the Family 
Proceedings Act 1980. 
128 For more detail see Bill Atkin "Financial Support: Who Supports Whom?'' in Marie 
Henaghan and Bill Atkin (eds) Family Law Policy in New 'Zealand (4th ed, LexisNexis, 
Wellington, 2013). 
129 For more detail see the Child Support Amendment Bill 2011 (337-1) as introduced on 5 
October 2011, the Child Support Amendment Bill 2011 (337-2) as reported on 31 October 
2012 by the Social Services Committee, and the Child Support Amendment Bill 2011 (337-3) 
as reported on 27 February 2013 by the committee of the whole House. 
130 Child Support Act 1991, s 99. 
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also changed dramatically, especially regarding who is encompassed by the 
legal definition of a family, how judicial discretion is exercised in family law 
cases involving children and how finances and property are shared upon 
separation or dissolution. The notion of the traditional nuclear family unit 
consisting of a married mother and father and their biologically related 
offspring still has its place in family law. However, the traditional family unit 
is no longer the only family group that enjoys significant legal recognition and 
protection. New Zealand family law now employs a much broader concept of 
families that includes a wide spectrum of familial relationships. The current 
debates surrounding adoption and marriage equality suggest that, although 
New Zealand family law has come a long way in the last 50 years, there is still 
a way to go to before all New Zealand families are treated equally by the law. 
